Functionalism as Theory and Method

Mitrany’s functionalism is a very particular doctrine in the context of social and political sciences. The history and the landscape of social sciences and social philosophy feature multiple examples of approaches based on the concept of function.  It is a common place that functionalist social theory “was for a long period the dominant form of sociological and anthropological theory, and its possibilities have been explored in great detail in those fields” (Barnes 2014). Functionalism has also been a significant presence is field such as: philosophy of mind, psychology, economics, and architecture. Moreover, “functionalist forms of thought have penetrated so deeply into the culture of the social sciences that they are often employed without being explicitly recognized as such” (Barnes 2014). Mitrany’s approach is thus just one among many “functionalisms”.

As presented by him, functionalism has both a positive and a normative dimension but -that being said- the general approach advanced by Mitrany is predominantly of what today is called of a “practice and policy-oriented” type. The center of gravity is mostly at an applied, practical level. Yet, bringing the problem of functionalism and of social functions to the forefront not only of analysis but also of policy recommendations, raises very profound foundational, philosophical and social theory problems.

As the philosopher Mario Bunge (2000) puts it, “Philosophical analyses of the concepts of function and functional explanation are legion. It is obvious from these studies that the word ‘function’ does not designate a single all-purpose concept of function, but in fact a plurality of function concepts…. it is still not clear how many function concepts there are, and whether they are logically related, and if so, how. Nor is it clear which of these many function concepts occur in which scientific disciplines: Is there one or more universal function concept which can be found in any branch of science, and are there specific notions occurring only in a particular science? Furthermore, if the word ‘function’ designates a plurality of concepts, what precisely is a functional explanation? And what about the term ‘functionalism’: it, accordingly, designates different functionalisms, too?”

In these circumstances, the question is: What is the place of Mitrany’s functionalism among other forms of thinking in terms of function and functional analysis? In what measure there is a relationship between these various approaches? In what measure could these different forms and methods support each other and in what measure they are incompatible? What is the relationship between the functionalist approach, as an analytical tool, and the functionalist perspective, as a normative or prescriptive tool? What are the best ways of developing hands-on functionalist methods and analysis? What could we learn from the previous applications of functionalist modes of thinking in social sciences and the criticisms of that? How could we extend functionalist insights from natural and biological sciences to social and political sciences? What is the relationship between institutional theory and functionalism? What is the relationship between governance theory and functionalism? What are the limits functionalism?

These and similar questions are motivated and inspired by a closer look at the idea of “functionalism”, as advanced by Mitrany’s work. The Center will encourage scholars and students to revisit these questions, as well as the theoretical and applied problems these questions point to, in the light of the contemporary developments in social sciences and social philosophy.